The Daily Hegemonist

An enlightened review.

Peter Berkowitz's review of Gertrude Himmelfarb's latest work, The Roads to Modernity : The British, French, and American Enlightenments, is itself worth reading in its entirety. The last two paragraphs are particularly noteworthy:

Himmelfarb refrains from drawing lessons for the present from her exploration of the past. About the closest she comes is to remark that in America it was “a belief in human imperfectability, and the civic and political arrangements deriving from that belief, which sustained the country — a united country — through all the turmoil of its history.” However, had she wished to relax her scholar’s self-discipline and indulge in informed speculation concerning our current predicament, her rich and suggestive historical explorations would have furnished ample opportunity.

For example, she might have observed that the conceit driving the French doctrine of the general will is alive and well in the thinking of those international lawyers who today seek to bind all nations (but especially the United States) on the basis of principles that, despite vigorous disagreement among nations and the absence of consent, possess, the lawyers insist, universal validity and therefore reflect the will of all peoples everywhere. She might also have suggested that the respect for the limits of reason which leads to regard for the wisdom embodied in tradition and the mystery and teachings of religious faith is no less an imperative of reason than it was in the eighteenth century. And, in light of Edmund Burke’s complex career, she might have pursued the thought that because, now as then, circumstances vary and threats to liberty are multifarious, it may well be the better part of wisdom to struggle at home, on the leading edge of the Enlightenment, to conserve freedom’s moral preconditions while seeking progress abroad in the protection of liberty and equality. Although Himmelfarb leaves such speculations to others, her historical labors clarify their pertinence and lay intellectual foundations for their pursuit.

When Michael E. O'Hanlon's insightful analysis of the origins of the postwar contretemps in Iraq and Tod Lindberg's remarkably open explication of neoconservativism's liberal origins are also taken into account, is is apparent that Policy Review has shed some of its more grandiose notions in favor of a more balanced appraisal of current events.

An overdue development, perhaps — but one to be commended, nonetheless.

Bowling for Karbala.

One of the many disappointments of the modern age is the seemingly irreversible decline in the erudition and rigor of what passes for social commentary throughout the political spectrum, especially amongst the self-anointed champions of the downtrodden. When combined with the incestuous relationship between the mainstream press, publishers, and the film industry, the end result of ridiculously-overhyped mediocrity is as predictable as it is regrettable.

Michael Moore's latest oevure, Fahrenheit 9/11, is a classic example of this trend. Mr. Moore's polemic (one hesitates to term it a 'documentary', given its extremely one-sided viewpoint and lack of follow-through, more of which momentarily) is a tired and tiring melange of partisan ranting, ad hominem bellicosity, and gleeful malice which seems not so much intended to inform or persuade as to flatter the vanity of those who already share Mr. Moore's views on the subject of the current Bush Administration generally and the invasion of Iraq in particular. In point of fact, Fahrenheit 9/11 is distinguishable from the amateur efforts on display at MoveOn.org mainly by the latter's lack of cameos by Mr. Moore himself, none of which add any particular gravitas or insight to the film.

Which is unfortunate because, on a few occasions, Fahrenheit 9/11 touches ever-so-briefly upon several pressing and genuinely relevant issues which merit further investigation:

The tardy, tepid, and timid nature of the Administration's assault upon Afghanistan and the Taliban subsequent to 9/11.

The venality and cupidity of various defense-related corporations so eager to cash in on the supposed windfalls to be had in postwar Iraq that their various officers, spokesmen, and other employees come across as unintentional self-caricatures of the tophatted 'war profiteers' of Marxist demagoguery.

The unsurprising yet completely indefensible fact that very few, if any, Members of Congress bother to actually read the bills set before them prior to voting on the legislation in question.

The Administration's incomprehensible lack of preparation for the aftermath of the Iraqi conflict.

The Administration's inexplicable decision to spirit members of the bin Laden family out of the United States on 9/13/01, without so much as a single interview by the FBI, CIA, or other agencies of the law enforcement and/or intelligence communities.

The Administration's apparent encouragement of the military and CIA to engage in the torture and abuse of prisoners and 'detainees' in Iraq and elsewhere.

The general incompetence, ineffectiveness, and irrelevance of the Department of Homeland Security and its various bureaux.

The fact that the President and members of the Cabinet routinely justify various intrusive and extraordinary measures (detaining suspected terrorists outside the normal legal system, secret trials, warrantless wiretaps, etc.) by asserting that the United States is at war — and yet the Congress has not formally declared war on any nation or entity in response to 9/11, and therefore there is no end in sight to the current claimed state of emergency.

The effect of inadequate numbers of troops, armaments, supplies, and transport, combined with the seemingly open-ended commitment in Iraq, on the nation's ability to respond to more direct and strategic threats from China, North Korea, Iran, and Saudi-sponsored terrorists such as Al Qaeda.

The unprecedented and corrosive influence of Saudi money on the political process in Washington, D.C., in general, and details of the longstanding relationship between the Bush and bin Laden families, in particular.

In short, Michael Moore somehow manages near-total avoidance of a serious examination and critique of the Administration's national security policy from either the Right or the Left, opting instead to produce a shallow and predictable sop to his apparent target constituency, the relatively small body of hardcore political activists who are already guaranteed to share Moore's views without need of further persuading.

For those interested in a substantive discourse on many of these issues, especially the origins of the U.S.-Saudi relationship and Saudi influence on American policy in the Middle East and around the world, former CIA operative Robert Baer's Sleeping with the Devil is a good starting point. And at $17.00 in trade paperback, it's a far better value than spending a similar sum for a ticket to see Fahrenheit 9/11 plus popcorn and soda, while at the same allowing one to avoid Mr. Moore's puffery and self-importance completely — a bargain at any price.

Empire in Reverse.

One of the unspoken understandings among the politically-engaged prior to the latest Iraqi adventure was that, barring absolute military defeat in detail, we would quickly prevail in the conflict and, whatever else may come, the oil revenues of a rapidly-revitalized Iraq would pay for the whole shebang (and, it was hinted, help pick up a moribund American economy in the process by ensuring that the world price of oil declined substantially). Many on the political Left castigated the Administration as being driven solely by the desire to exploit the Iraqi oil fields for the selfish benefit of the United States and her ally, Great Britain.

Indeed, this basic tent was a source of some small comfort to many conservatives who opposed the invasion on other grounds; if nothing else, we'd recoup our costs toot-sweet, and would get a stimulus of our own economy in the process. The President himself mentioned on more than one occasion that a primary motive among the ever-shifting justifications for the involvement of the United States in Iraq was to finally bring the benefits of Iraq's natural resources to the Iraqi people, as they so richly deserved.

Now, however, we're hearing a different tune.

On another note, the officials said their projections for revenues from Iraqi oil sales now stand at:

• $12 billion for fiscal 2004, which begins in October.

• $20 billion for fiscal 2005 and fiscal 2006.

The administration initially had predicted that Iraqi oil sales would pay for the bulk of the reconstruction and political transition after the war.

Now the administration says it wants $20 billion from Congress and tens of billions more from other nations to help pay reconstruction costs.

To recap, we've invaded one of the most oil-rich countries in the world; despite extensive experience in postwar reconstruction of defeated enemies, a supposed focus in recent years on 'nation-building' (whatever that is), and the fact that our septuagenerian SecDef is old enough to have direct memories of how we handled said reconstruction, we seem to've been totally unprepared to run a competent occupation government in Iraq; gasoline prices in the U.S. now exceed $2/gallon for no discernible reason other than vague mutterings about pipelines in Arizona and Labor Day weekend demand; we've done things like put out the oil fires of Kuwait after the first Gulf conflict in months rather than years, not to mention putting the carrier USS Yorktown back into action in less than 48 hours after it was heavily damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea, this herculean task being within our capabilities some 60 years ago; and yet we can't even seem to get the oil fields of Iraq pumping again within something approaching a reasonable timeframe so as to benefit both the Iraqis and ourselves?

This empire-building we've embarked upon in the Middle East sure seems to be an expensive proposition, at least for the American taxpayer. Where's our share of the spoils?

Are we?

One of the many frustrations of the current situation in the Middle East is the fact that the Administration and its underlings keep insisting that we're in a state of unending war, although the Congress has yet to make any declarations to that effect:

Dov S. Zakheim, the Pentagon's chief financial officer, warned that Congress should expect additional budget requests. "This isn't a flash-in-the-pan kind of problem," he said at a joint meeting in Arlington of the U.S. Naval Institute and the Marine Corps Association, two professional organizations for military officers. "We're at war -- for some time."

Lt. Gen. Robert Magnus, the Marine Corps' chief budget officer, agreed with that estimate of long-term costs. "This is a generational war," he said, speaking alongside Zakheim. "This isn't just Osama bin Laden."

That last bit goes without saying, as Osama bin Laden and the recent despot of Iraq seem to've had little or nothing to do with one another; one can only hope that at some point in their peregrinations, it will finally dawn on our seemingly-benighted politicians that their naviete (this is being charitable) has resulted not only in a manifestly avoidable embarrassment in Iraq, but an inexplicable lack of consequences for those most deserving of a good thrashing, irrespective of our long-term ambitions in the region.

One can only hope that priorities will be adjusted and resources aligned with commitments, whatever those may be, before the next probable confrontation comes to a head.

The suspense is almost unbearable.

How quickly we forget.

One of the most puzzling things about our adventure in Iraq has been the seeming near-total ignorance of anyone in government - including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who's old enough to remember the events in question - of the methods we used to restore order in the last two countries which we occupied for any length of time.

I speak, of course, of Germany and Japan after their defeat in the Second World War.

Of the two, postwar Germany seems the closer analogy; a secular uni-party totalitarian state, a tyrant who met his self-inflicted end out of the public eye (to this day, there are those who claim that Hitler escaped to South America, or Antarctica, or what-have-you), a fearsome secret police apparatus, legions of petty bureaucrats who made their livelihood by serving the regime in one form or another, and a wrecked public infrastructure. The situation was complicated by legions of displaced persons ('DPs') comprised variously of unhoused civilians, freed POWs, and of course the survivors of the concentration camps.

Yet there were Civil Affairs units moving forward with the various armies as they advanced, setting up registration centers, issuing officially-recognized ID cards and scrip, and generally keeping order while the front lines advanced. And once Admiral Doenitz, Hitler's successor, signed the instrument of surrender . . .

Oh, yes - the Germans surrendered, you see. Unconditionally. Although there were holdouts here and there for a time (reports of a Redoubt in Bavaria proved to be false; the feared 'Werewolf' guerilla-type uprising of Nazi diehards never occurred, just vice, petty crime, and black marketeering on a grand scale), by and large, the fighting was quickly over and work begun on the administration of the defeated nation.

Sectors of responsibility were established, and the organization of the Occupied Military Government, United States (OMGUS), proceed apace. General Lucius Clay was named as the U.S. Military Governor of Occuptied Germany, and handed many crises great and small with great aplomb as the United States worked to establish a de-Nazified, democratically-elected government in the face of relentless westward pressure by the USSR. This process took some eight years, and is one of the great examples of American foresight and generosity in the Twentieth Century.

General MacArthur's accomplishments along these lines in postwar Japan were in some ways even more remarkable.

None of this happened spontaneously. A great deal of planning for occupation took place prior to the Allied victory, beginning in 1943 - two full years before Hitler and his mistress met their end in that desolate Berlin bunker.

And so, fifty years later, we've apparently learned nothing from the experience.

Not for want of documentation - the full text of The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944 - 1946 has long been available online to anyone in the present Administration who cared to have a look. The numerous popular histories of the period notwithstanding, there's much to be found of relevance in this official account, paid for with your tax dollars.

Authored by Dr. Earl F. Ziemke, USMC (ret.) and first printed in 1975, the work contains a great deal of useful information concerning the running of an occupied country. For example, on the matter of surrender:

. . . But the years between the wars had revealed, from the World War II viewpoint, a catastrophic defect in the 1918 armistice, namely, the Germans had not been convinced of their defeat. At the last minute on 6 November 1918, the German Army had refused to send a military representative to negotiate with the Allies. Mathias Erzberger, a civilian and a defeatist in the eyes of some Germans, had negotiated and signed the armistice. The military leadership, aided by right-wing politicians and press, had for two decades thereafter claimed to have been stabbed in the back. In the United States, many believed that Hitler had been successful at maneuvering his country into war because the German people and soldiers had been hoodwinked into believing they had not really been defeated in 1918. Both the form and the language of the surrender consequently seemed to be crucial in preventing a third world war.

Leaving aside the small problem of the United States not actually having been in a declared state of war with Iraq, it seems to me that a public surrender ceremony, even one completely staged-managed for the propaganda value alone (after decades under the heel of one despot or another, one rather thinks the Iraqis take that sort of thing in stride) would provide an important break-point in the public psyche, demonstrating that the Ba'athists had in fact been defeated in the field and undermining irredentism on the part of the diehards. And then there's the small matter of the electricity and other public utilities:

. . . Military government was competing with the image left behind by the enemy. In this competition, First Army G-5 had concluded, moral superiority and technical expertise needed to be backed by what Americans too often regarded as superficial appearances: offices arranged not only to be worked in but to look efficient, flags prominently displayed, officers who looked and acted their parts.

Once again, Dr. Ziemke demonstrates that no more than half a century ago, we seemed to know what we were doing. Contrast this with the almost unbelieveable fact that, in today's Army, there is precisely one active-duty Civil Affairs battalion to be found.

American soliders aren't much good as garrison troops, either - they want to have a clearly-defined mission, the motivations for which can be readily discerned and which are aimed at a general improvement in the state of things. Dr. Ziemke again:

. . . Here the Germans, alleged nation of sinners against peace and human decency though they might lie, became people who could be sick, hungry, and frightened, old and young, pretty and pitiable, guilty and innocent. Even though they might accept the idea of German collective guilt, the American soldiers did not feel at ease as agents of collective retribution.

By our signal failure to develop and implement a well-thought-out plan for the efficient administration of post-conflict Iraq, we've let down not only the Iraqi people, but our own soldiers, as well. By failing to establish a public, rigorous, and thorough de-Ba'athification program, we unwittingly lend credence to various conspiracy theories concerning the true motives behind the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, whatever those may've been (to my mind, we bombed and invaded the wrong country).

Surely, we can aspire to do at least as well as our forbears?

Cui bono?

According to U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter, it should be American workers:

. . . "If the American worker is going to pay for the defense of the free world," Hunter said in an interview, "he should participate fully in the manufacture of military goods . . ."

The article goes on to list some of the strategic concerns of reliance on foreign suppliers who may at some not-so-distant point in the future cease to be friendly to the interests of the United States. So, why is the Pentagon fighting the notion?

The tip of the iceberg.

I'm not sufficiently acquainted with the details of this case to offer a meaningful opinion on the veracity of Gregory Gabrenya's claims; based on personal experience, however, I can categorically state that U.S. reliance on suppliers of militarily-significant hardware and software who outsource to countries such as China, Pakistan, India, etc., is a clear and present danger to the security of the United States.

And this trend is accelerating.

If hostilities were to break out between the U.S. and China - or North Korea, or a nuclear-armed Iran - tomorrow, the consequences of this stupid, short-sighted, willful ignorance on the part of the defense acquistions bureaucracy, coupled with the venality of American business leaders, might well prove a military disaster in the making.